Sunday, February 26, 2017

PCI DSS Toolkit

Since 2012, Open Scoping Framework Group is providing a free PCI DSS Scoping toolkit.

Successful PCI DSS compliance depends upon the correct identification of the scope of the assessment. An overly narrow scope can jeopardize cardholder data, while an overly broad scope can add unnecessary cost and effort to the PCI compliance program. Subjective interpretation of the PCI DSS guidance results in a wide variance in practice among both QSAs and Participating Organizations.

When scoping errors occur, organizations will not focus on what matters most – that becomes a flaw - An overly narrow scope of assessment could potentially jeopardize cardholder data, while an overly broad scope potentially adds unnecessary cost and effort to achieving PCI compliance.

If you are a QSA, ISA or someone responsible for PCI compliance somehow you must follow these:

OSFG-Open Scoping Framework Group was originally created by Gene Kim whose name should be familiar to almost everyone - founder of Tripwire.  He got together his DevOps group to tackle the issues faced by all of us trying to scope the cardholder data environment (CDE) and the result was the toolkit.

Here are the activities that occur in CDE:

§ Processing – when cardholder data is actively being used by a system component (e.g., entered, edited, manipulated, printed, viewed) Open PCI DSS Scoping Toolkit (August 2012).

§ Storing – when cardholder data is inactive or at rest (e.g., located on electronic media, system component memory, paper).

§ Transmitting – when cardholder data is being transferred from one location to another (e.g., data in motion).

The toolkit defines three categories of systems.

Category 1 – System components that process, store or transmit cardholder data or are not isolated or restricted through controlled access from other Category 1 system components.

Category 2 – System components that have controlled access to a Category 1 system component.

Category 3 – System components that are isolated from all Category 1 system components.

People always get the reason why Category 1 devices are in scope because they are contained in the CDE.  While one would think that Category 3 components would be also just as easy to categorize as Category 1, but that is not necessarily the case.  The key is that Category 3 systems cannot have any access to Category 1 components.  Although attempt to ping Category 1 components from the Category 3 component could be used, a better test is to use Nmap or similar port scanner from a sample of Category 3 components to scan the CDE IP address range to determine if any ports are open.

While Category 3 components can be troublesome, it is the Category 2 devices that usually give everyone a problem including, at times, yours truly.  The reason is the connectivity issue as it can be very unclear at times whether or not a device actually has connectivity to the CDE.


To assist in identifying connected systems, the toolkit breaks Category 2 systems into four sub-categories.

Category 2a – System components which, through controlled access, provide security services (e.g., authentication) to a Category 1 device.

Category 2b – System components which, through controlled access, can initiate an inbound connection to a Category 1 device.

Category 2c – System components which, through controlled access, can only receive a connection from a Category 1 device (i.e., cannot initiate a connection).

Category 2x – System components which, through indirect and controlled access, have the ability to administer Category 1 devices. Note: Category 2x devices have no direct access to/from Category 1 devices.

The final pieces of the Open PCI DSS Scoping Toolkit I really like are the decision tree and the scenarios provided.  If these do not help explain how to scope your PCI assessment have, nothing will.

Although addressing the people and processes around cardholder data is a necessary part of any PCI compliance program, the Toolkit focuses almost entirely on categorizing the system components that comprise an organization’s computing environment. In addition, the Toolkit does not define what PCI DSS controls are required for each Toolkit category. Because every organization is different, it is up to each organization and its assessor to determine the nature, extent and effectiveness of each control to adequately mitigate the risks to cardholder data.

Again, if you do not yet have a copy of the Open PCI DSS Scoping Toolkit, hopefully this post will entice you to get a copy.

Thiago Leoncio.
IDM & Security SME.


Saturday, February 25, 2017

Cybersecurity threats everybody needs to know about on these cloudy days


Should we start conversations around forging ahead amid the varying minefield of company’s data threats?

Source: PROTENUS BREACH BAROMETER REPORT


Wrong/Poor cybersecurity practices

In many organizations there remains an inadequate culture of security, with companies failing to follow best practices, either due to lack of knowledge or an attitude that the effort and/or cost to comply is too burdensome.

For healthcare system with several aspects of cybersecurity remaining unregulated, levels of interest and investment vary widely within the industry. From the IT corner, one basic issue remains a lack of data encryption; among marketing & sales departments, a common issue remains poor password selection and protection, with some people outright working around them by sharing passwords among groups or posting them on monitors.


Insider threats


According to a report by Protenus, nearly half (43%) of the healthcare data breaches in 2016 were a result of insider threats, both unintentional and malicious.

Data protection also needs to consider malicious insider intent, which underscores the need for as-needed data access and protected,individual log-ins – particularly amid quick staff turnover, visiting consultants and the possibility of outsiders being able to walk in and access insider systems.
 Recent incidents illustrate that surprises do come from within, as when staff engage in billing fraud or improperly view records for celebrity patients or user, or when outsiders pose as company staff.


Ransomware

Cases of ransomware and also some non-ransomware cases where hackers acquired databases and subsequently tried to extort covered entities. When extortion failed, they put user content up for sale on the dark web. There were so many user records put up for sale in 2016 that the price per record dropped significantly as the market became flooded.

These hacks have taken the healthcare industry by storm with their terrifying hijacking of hospital systems that demand a payment demand to return system control. Healthcare entities are viewed as ideal targets because it is so critical to them to avoid data or service interruption.

Source: Protenus and other IDM sources.


Thiago Leoncio.